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I. INTRODUCTION
Neither the hybridity nor the diffusion of laws is new. 1
Within Europe, law predated the state and the creation of
genuinely national laws; a legal ‘system’ centered on the modern
nation-state, and the elimination of competing jurisdictions and
marginalization of non-legal norms was a very long historical
process. Especially before the nineteenth century, there were
multiple contemporaneous legal orders co-existing in the same
geographical space and at the same time. Modern national
traditions are unique hybrids rooted in diverse customary or folklaws, summary and discretionary jurisdictions, local and particular
iura propria, the Romano-canonical ‘learned laws’ or ius
commune, and other trans-territorial iura communia (including
feudal law and the lex mercatoria). Over time, these various bodies
of law were linked to public institutions and increasingly
meaningful and centralized powers of enforcement. They only
slowly came under the control of early modern states to form
modern legal traditions, contributing much to the substance and
subsequent success of common laws.
This legal hybridity was paralleled by additional normative
hybridity. Indeed, the boundaries between such official and
unofficial legalities were porous. The ‘law’ blurred seamlessly into
the less formally institutionalized, but meaningful, normative
pluralism from which more formal legal rules often emerged and
with which they would continue to compete. As Marc Galanter has
put it:
One of the striking features of the modern world has
been the emergence of those institutionalintellectual complexes that we identify as national
legal systems. Such a system consists of
1. See Seán Patrick Donlan, Remembering: Legal Hybridity and Legal
L.
REV.
1
(2011),
available
at
History,
2
COMP.
www.comparativelawreview.com/ojs/index.php/CoLR/article/view/13/17 (Last
visited November 9, 2011) and Histories of Hybridity: A Problem, a Primer, a
Plea, and a Plan (Of Sorts), in COMPARATIVE LAW AND HYBRID LEGAL
TRADITIONS (Eleanor Cashin-Ritaine, Seán Patrick Donlan & Martin Sychold
eds., 2010), full volume available at www.e-collection.isdc.ch/# (Last visited
November 9, 2011).
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institutions, connected to the state, guided by and
propounding a body of normative learning,
purporting to encompass and control all the other
institutions in the society and to subject them to a
regime of general rules. These complexes
consolidated and displaced the earlier diverse array
of normative orderings in society, reducing them to
a subordinate and interstitial status. 2
Similar patterns of hybridity occurred with the diffusion of
European law, often though colonialism, around the world. 3 Both
in the West and beyond, however, the displacement and reduction
of non-state norms has not made them unimportant.
The extraordinary legal and normative hybridity
(hereinafter ‘hybridity’) of the Mediterranean region was produced
in a complex history of conquest, colonization, and social and legal
diffusion across shifting and porous political boundaries. 4 Studies
of this hybridity and diffusion have been isolated, sporadic, and too
often framed within narrow jurisdictional and disciplinary
constraints. The objective of the Mediterranean Hybridity Project
is, through a collaborative international and interdisciplinary
network of experts, (i) to produce a published comparative or
cross-cultural collection on the subject and, if possible, (ii) to
generate additional projects related to our theme. Encompassing
both state laws and other social norms, the outcome will be more
accurate, useful, and accessible accounts of Mediterranean
legalities. Our project might produce an analytical model more
useful than existing taxonomies and methods for new research in
the region, in Europe, and around the world.
2. Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and
Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 19 (1981).
3. Indeed, ‘[s]cholars who study the one could learn from those who study
the other, and vice versa.’ Dirk Heirbaut, Europe and the People without Legal
History: On the Need for a General History of Non-European Law, 68 LEGAL
HIST. REV. 269, 277 (2008).
4. “If a system is attached to two families . . . the question is one of
genealogy, and thus of historical research first of all.” Maurice Tancelin, How
Can a Legal System be a Mixed System?, in FREDERICK PARKER WALTON, THE
SCOPE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOWER CANADA 3 (Wilson
& Lafleur, 1980) (1907).
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This brief paper outlines the initial general approach to the
project and related issues. It reflects its progress as of summer
2011. In the second section, the general outlines of the project will
be laid out based on a Roundtable held in Catania in late October
2010. The remaining sections will reflect my thinking on the
subject rather than that of the project Committee or participants.
The concepts of ‘hybridity’ and ‘diffusion,’ as used in my research,
will be discussed in more detail in the second section. The third
section will discuss legal hybridity, especially mixed systems; the
fourth section will briefly discuss normative hybridity and the
relationship between comparativists and social scientists. While
my interpretation of these topics was not imposed on those
participating in the project, it was influential. The paper is meant
both to suggest how the project is conceived and how it might
develop. It suggests a shared, basic vocabulary for the project and
notes some of the conceptual resources available in comparative
law and in the social sciences. Specific information on the
Mediterranean region is not discussed here.
II. THE MEDITERRANEAN HYBRIDITY PROJECT
The Mediterranean Hybridity Project was the result of
discussions between members of Juris Diversitas, an international
legal association dedicated to (i) the study of legal and normative
mixtures and movements and (ii) the encouragement of
interdisciplinary dialogue between jurists and others. 5 Begun in
2007, the group has so far held two symposia on the subject of
hybridity. The first was co-organized with the Swiss Institute of
Comparative Law in September 2009. A collection of articles
generated by that event was recently published as Comparative
Law and Hybrid Legal Traditions (2010). A second symposium
was held in June 2010 in Malta and focused on Mediterranean
5. See Juris Diversitas at www.jurisdiversitas.blogspot.com (Last visited
November 9, 2011). Our Executive Committee includes: Seán Patrick Donlan
(Limerick), Ignazio Castellucci (Trento and Macau), Lukas HeckerdornUrschler (Swiss Institute of Comparative Law), Salvatore Mancuso (Macau),
and Olivier Moréteau (Louisiana State). Our Advisory Board is composed of
Patrick Glenn, Marco Guadagni, Roderick Macdonald, Werner Menski, Esin
Örücü, Vernon Valentine Palmer, Rodolfo Sacco, Boaventura de Sousa Santos,
William Twining, and Jacques Vanderlinden.
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hybridity. It was co-organized with the Department of Civil Law
and the Mediterranean Institute of the University of Malta.
Professor Vernon Palmer, President of the World Society of Mixed
Jurisdiction Jurists and author of Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide:
The Third Legal Family, was kind enough to launch the
Mediterranean project there. 6 In addition, a project planning
roundtable was held in October 2010 at the Faculty of Political
Science at the University of Catania to finalize the questionnaire to
be used in our work and to begin the selection of jurisdictional
reporters. This will occur over the course of 2011. Another
colloquium will be held at Rabat, Morocco in June 2012. 7
The various legal orders, past and present, of the
Mediterranean include the Anglo-British, canonical, continental,
Islamic, Ottoman, Roman, socialist, and Talmudic traditions as
well as various customary and trans-territorial legal traditions. This
legal hybridity predates the establishment of modern nation-states.
It is complemented and further complicated by an equally diverse
and dynamic normative hybridity. 8 Neither has received sufficient
attention from jurists and social scientists. The project is rooted in
the desire across the region and within different disciplines to
improve our knowledge of the various legalities in the EuroMediterranean region. It encompasses both the state laws that are
the domain of lawyers and the wider normative orders typically
studied by social scientists. 9 In particular, it will both draw on and
go beyond earlier analysis of (i) ‘mixed legal systems,’ where
6. VERNON V. PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD
LEGAL FAMILY (2001). On the World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists, see
www.mixedjurisdiction.org (Last visited November 9, 2011). The papers of the
Maltese conference are published in this volume of the J. CIV. L. STUD.
7. Doing justice: official and unofficial ‘legalities’ in practice (Rabat,
Morocco; June 15-16, 2012).
8. For a different, more critical, understanding of ‘hybridity’ in the
Mediterranean, see Christian Bromberger, Towards an Anthropology of the
Mediterranean, 17 HIST.& ANTHROPOLOGY 91, especially 96-98 (2006).
9. In an even bolder program than ours, the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) proposes to codify both common principles
and non-state practices. See Salvatore Mancuso, Creating Mixed (?)
Jurisdictions: Some Methodological Reflections on Legal Integration in the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region, J. COMP. L.
(forthcoming 2012).
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diverse state laws emerge from different legal traditions, and (ii)
‘legal’ or ‘normative.’ The focus of the former scholarship is
typically limited to state law, especially mixtures of explicitly
Western legal traditions. Study of the latter is rooted in empirical
study, but is often focused on non-Western communities and rarely
extends across state boundaries. 10 As will be clear, these two
bodies of scholarship are importantly related. 11
A Managing Committee is responsible for the coordination,
steering, and oversight of the project. 12 An Advisory Board is
being created to assist the Committee. 13 The project’s main
objective is the relatively simple production of a comparative
collection on legal and normative hybridity in the region. 14 Our
project addresses the existing lacuna in research by developing a
collaborative inter- and multi-disciplinary network of experts on
10. But see LAURA NADER & HARRY TODD, THE DISPUTING PROCESS:
LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (1976), the culmination of the fieldwork on the
“Berkeley Village Project.” It involved, among others, Lebanon, Sardinia, and
Turkey; see also PEREGRINE HORDEN & NICHOLAS PURCELL, Mists of Time:
Anthropology and Continuity, a bibliographical essay, in THE CORRUPTING SEA:
A STUDY OF MEDITERRANEAN HISTORY (2000).
11. On joining the study of legal and normative hybridity, as I define these
ideas, see Seán Patrick Donlan, ‘The Ubiquity of Hybridity: Norms and Laws,
Past and Present, and around the Globe,’ a paper delivered at the New Frontiers
of Comparative Law Conference (Macau, November 11, 2011). A follow-up
article will be published in 2012. For a similar argument, see Ido Shahar, State,
Society and the Relations between Them: Implications for the Study of Legal
Pluralism, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 417, 441 (2008). See also Mauro
Bussani, A Pluralist Approach to Mixed Jurisdictions, J. COMP. L. (forthcoming
2012).
12. In addition to me, the Committee includes Baudouin Dupret and
Olivier Moréteau. The Committee provides continuity within the project’s
flexible framework. Editorial and Advisory Boards may also be created to
provide advice and assistance to the Committee.
13. The Advisory Board includes Biagio Andò, Tom Bennett, Nathalie
Bernard-Maugiron, Sue Farran, David Nelken, Esin Örücü, Vernon Palmer, and
David Zammit.
14. Cf. John H. Merryman, Law and Development Memoirs II: SLADE, 48
AM. J. COMP. L. 713 (2000). The SLADE (Studies in Law and Development)
project resulted in LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE AND
LATIN AMERICA: A HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR
COMPARATIVE STUDY (John H. Merryman, David S. Clark, & Lawrence M.
Friedman eds., 1979). It included both Italy and Spain.
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the region—from law, anthropology, geography, history,
sociology, etc.—to foster dialogue on the subject. The project will
benefit from this jurisdictional and disciplinary diversity. Scholars
from throughout Europe, the Levant, North Africa, and beyond
will participate. Chief reporters will be selected for each of the
jurisdictions involved. It will be the responsibility of the chief
reporters, in collaboration with the Committee, to assemble a team
of additional reporters appropriate to complete the reports and to
ensure that deadlines are met. Essential to the project is the
creation of a questionnaire on which to structure our work. This
questionnaire will be produced by the Committee in discussion
with the participants. The combination of such reports and their
subsequent analysis is an established method of comparative law.
The International Academy of Comparative Law takes an
analogous approach in the thematic reports to its quadrennial
World Congress. In the 1990s, two projects managed in a similar
manner by the legal philosophers Neil MacCormick and Robert S.
Summers ended in the publication of important comparative
collections on statutory interpretation and precedent. 15 Our project
will take a broadly similar approach, but will marry this
comparative approach with other conceptual and empirical models
from the legal and social sciences.
In its origins, ‘hybrid’ had a very narrow meaning. The
Latin “hibrida was the offspring of a (female) domestic sow and a
(male) wild boar.” 16 In fact, a hybrid is often seen as a complex
individual entity, a singularity, from two parents. More recently,
however, it has become far broader in application. Indeed, the
15. INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Neil MacCormick
& Robert Summers eds., 1991) and INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Neil MacCormick & Robert Summers eds., 1997). For
summaries, see Robert S. Summers, The Comparative Statutory Interpretation
Project, 17 CORNELL L. FORUM 7 (1990) and The Comparative Precedent
Project, 1992-97, 24 CORNELL L. FORUM 17 (1997). These projects grew out of
earlier work comparing English and American law. PATRICK. S. ATIYAH &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS (1987). See also Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in
Anglo-American Law, 14 CORNELL L. FORUM 2 (1987).
16. Brian Stross, The Hybrid Metaphor: From Biology to Culture, 112 J.
AM. FOLKLORE 254 (1999).
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word in its current usages is arguably, as the historian Peter Burke
has written, “a slippery, ambiguous term, at once literal and
metaphorical, descriptive and explanatory.” 17 ‘Hybridity’ has also
developed more nuanced meanings in, for example, Post-Colonial
Studies, serving both as a recognition of social complexity, “a way
out of binary thinking” about cultures (and individuals). 18 This
understanding of hybridity is not entirely unrelated to our Project.
Indeed, even the legal historian George Dargo, who wrote the
classic work on the founding of Louisiana’s mixed system, has
recently noted that, in Louisiana, “[h]ybridity produced a rich
interaction—call it conflict, contestation, or negotiation—from
within the mix of languages, cultures and legal traditions that the
Americans found in their first true colony.” 19 Hybridity’ is thus
meant to suggest, more explicitly than discussions of legal
‘mixes’—which typically focus on the various positive laws of the
state—a more dynamic complexity of both laws and other norms.
More diffuse normative influences and practical considerations,
both internal and external are also relevant, not least geo-political,
economic, and social relationships of power.
The phrase ‘legal hybridity’ is only rarely employed in
either legal or social science. Where it is used, it is broadly
synonymous with ‘legal pluralism.’ 20 Iza Hussin has used it to
17. PETER BURKE, CULTURAL HYBRIDITY 54 (2009).
18. ANJALI PRABHU, HYBRIDITY: LIMITS, TRANSFORMATIONS, PROSPECTS
1 (2007). Indeed, it also arguably “allow[s for] the inscription of the agency of
the subaltern, and even permit[s] a restructuring and destabilizing of power.” Id.
Note that the focus of Prabhu’s book is on the small islands of Mauritius and La
Réunion, the former of which is a mixed legal system. See also HOMI BHABHA,
THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (1994) and Alpana Roy, Postcolonial Theory and
Law: A Critical Introduction, 29 ADEL. L. REV. 317 (2008).
19. George Dargo, The Digest of 1808: Historical Perspectives, 24 TUL.
EUR. & CIV. L. F. 1, 30 (2009). See id., 29-30 (citing BHABHA, supra note, 2).
This is indeed far more nuanced than what he earlier called the “clash of
traditions” in nineteenth-century Louisiana. See GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S
LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS (1975, revised
2010).
20. Cf. Justin Holbrook’s use of ‘legal hybridity’ for what I call ‘normative
hybridity.’ Legal Hybridity in the Philippines: Lessons in Legal Pluralism from
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3 n. 8
(2010). See also Clever Mapaure, Legal Hybridity: A Comparative Analysis of
the Role of Custom and Intricacies of Legal Pluralism in Relation to Customary
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capture not only plural laws and norms, but power relationships as
well. 21 For the purposes of the project, however, ‘legal hybridity’
refers to state laws and legal principles (hereinafter ‘laws’), those
traditions generally, conventionally recognized as legal by modern
lawyers. 22 This is the focus of most mixed jurists, though it may
extend still further to, among others, the ‘law in action,’ ‘legal
formants,’ or ‘legal polycentricity.’ 23 ‘Normative hybridity’ is, for
us, a far wider concept, largely synonymous with ‘normative
pluralism’ and including both laws and wider patterns of normative
ordering and non-state norms (hereinafter ‘norms’). Defined in this
way, law and norms are not opposites but points on a continuum.
As Baudouin Dupret writes,
[i]n our attempt to analyze the phenomenon of
norms we should move resolutely away from legal
categories and towards social categories, and . . . we
should do this both at a conceptual level and at a
methodological level. This is a shift from the law to
the norm, with all that such a move implies in terms
of assimilation with social constraints . . . Law must
be stripped of its conceptual status and returned to
the fold of general normativity, so that there is no
longer any ex post facto distinction between it and
other types of norms such as moral injunctions,

Marriages in Britain and African Jurisdictions, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1515630 (Last visited November 9, 2011).
21. Iza Hussin, The Pursuit of the Perak Regalia: Islam, Law, and the
Politics of Authority in the Colonial State, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 759 (2007).
See also Mancuso, supra note 8.
22. See e.g. Biagio Andò, Seán Patrick Donlan & David Zammit, “A
Happy Union?” Malta’s Legal Hybridity, 27 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. F.
(forthcoming 2012).
23. Donlan, supra note 11. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic
Approach to Comparative Law, (1991) 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 and 343; HANNE
PETERSEN & HENRIK ZAHLE, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY: CONSEQUENCES OF
PLURALISM IN LAW (1995); and ARI HIROVONEN, POLYCENTRICITY: THE
MULTIPLE SCENES OF LAW (1998).
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political rules, traditions, habits, etiquette and even
table manners. 24
This normative hybridity is not, or not necessarily, prescriptive, but
descriptive of a social fact with which scholars must contend.
Indeed, “as a purely descriptive matter, hybridity cannot be wished
away.” 25
Herbert Hart, the foremost legal positivist of the twentieth
century, began The Concept of Law (1961) with the remark that
‘‘[f]ew questions concerning human society have been asked with
such persistence and answered by serious thinkers in so many
diverse, strange, and even paradoxical ways as to the question,
What is law?” 26 This fact, and related definitional complexities,
have important consequences for our project. We must both
recognize the complexity of defining ‘law’ while, at the same time,
provide flexibility and reasonable coherence to our work. The
distinction between law and norms employed here is largely meant
to reflect juristic practice and modern, common understandings of
the terms in the West. This is not meant to suggest deep
ontological divisions between laws and other norms. 27 It is
24. Baudouin Dupret, Legal Pluralism, Normative Plurality, and the Arab
World, in LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 31 (Baudouin Dupret,
Maurits Berger, & Laila al-Zwaini eds., 1999); See also Baudouin Dupret, Legal
Pluralism, Plurality of Laws, and Legal Practices: Theories, Critiques, and
Praxiological Re-Specification, 1 EUROPEAN J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007) and What
is Islamic Law? A Praxiological Answer and an Egyptian Case Study, 24
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 79 (2007).
25. Paul S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155,
1179 (2007). For a “social fact conception of legal pluralism,” see William
Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 473, 488-489 (2010).
26. HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1997). Twining
has proposed a “flexible working conception of law” in which “[f]rom a global
perspective it is illuminating to conceive of law as a species of institutionalized
social practice that is oriented to ordering relations between subjects at one or
more levels of relations and of ordering.” WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL
JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 116-117
(2009).
27. Twining refers to the difficulty in distinguishing legal and non-legal
phenomenon as the problem of “the definitional stop.” See Twining, supra note
25, at 497. There exists a long-established and widespread conventional usage of
'law' (or, at least, 'lex') that defines the 'legal' on the basis of some minimal
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intended instead to prevent the project from becoming mired in
complex theoretical debates in its early stages. 28 State laws are
distinct, at least in practice, from other norms. Western legal
institutions, in particular, are highly formalized or institutionalized
in contrast to alternative forms of normative ordering. This view is,
however, open to challenge over the course of the project. Even
within modern Anglo-American analytical jurisprudence or legal
philosophy, there has been a move away from a narrow focus on
state law. For example, the late Neil MacCormick wrote that
“[i]nstitutional normative orders are characterized by the presence
of explicitly issued norms and decisions in authentic (that, in some
way official or authorized) texts, such that understanding and
interpreting such texts becomes an implicit part of maintaining the
order.” 29 More important was the argument that “[l]aw is
institutional normative order, and state law is simply one form of
law.” 30 As noted, our focus will extend to normative orders while
avoiding, for now, any decision on whether such orders are indeed
“law, properly so-called.” 31
Our decision to avoid using ‘legal pluralism’ is, in part, the
result of the very different ways in which that phrase may be

institutional structure and accepted authority. Critically, however, the
development of this convention preceded the development of the mature state
and a later conventional correspondence of law and the state. Cf. Jean-Louis
Halpérin, The Concept of Law: A Western Transplant, 10 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN L. 333, 353 (2009). 'Ius' had, of course, a less precise meaning of
right or rightness.
28. With sufficient support, a future meeting of participants will be
organized that would allow for such theoretical considerations to be revisited.
29. Neil MacCormick, Institutions and Laws Again, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1429,
1431 (1999). See also Mariano Croce, Is there a Place for Legal Theory Today?
The Distinctiveness of Law in the Age of Pluralism, in LAW’S ENVIRONMENT:
CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Ubaldus de Vries & Lyana Francot eds., 2011).
30. Neil MacCormick, Institutional Normative Order: A Conception of
Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1051, 1067 (1997). See also NEIL MACCORMICK,
INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY (2009); and William
Twining, Institutions of Law From a Global Perspective: Standpoint, Pluralism
and Non-State Law, in LAW AS INSTITUTIONAL NORMATIVE ORDER
(Maksymilian Del Mar & Zenon Bankowski eds., 2009).
31. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVIDENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED (1832), Lecture Five.
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employed. Both comparative lawyers and legal historians
frequently use ‘legal pluralism’ as a synonym for what is called
‘legal hybridity’ here. 32 Social scientists have, however, usually
used the same term in their more extensive discussions of the
concept of normative hybridity. 33 This social science use of ‘legal’
to include both state laws and non-state norms has admittedly
made scholars sensitive to similarities between them. It has also
often confused jurists, arguably dissuading many from engagement
with social scientists. 34 This is not always true. A small number of
jurists have similarly noted that “the existence and content of
explicit laws depend on a network of tacit understandings and
unwritten conventions, rooted in the soil of social interaction.”35
These are also called law: ‘everyday law,’ ‘implicit law,’ ‘informal
law,’ and ‘unofficial law.’ 36 But, as the anthropologist Sally Engle
Merry puts it, “calling all forms of ordering that are not state law
by the name law confounds the analysis.” 37 Where project
32. In social science debates, this has often been called ‘state’ or ‘weak’
legal pluralism. Legal historians have to deal with an additional complication.
The ‘State’ has not always existed and use of ‘state’ terminology can, depending
on the historian’s focus, be deeply anachronistic.
33. This is also referred to as ‘deep’ or ‘strong’ legal pluralism. See
Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent
Debate about Legal Pluralism, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 21 (1998).
34. Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM 37, 40 (2002).
35. Gerald J. Postema, Implicit law, in REDISCOVERING FULLER: ESSAYS
ON IMPLICIT LAW AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 255 (Willem J. Witteveen &
Wibren van der Burg eds., 1999). Postema was writing about Lon Fuller.
Fuller’s thoughts on “implicit law” were discussed in LON FULLER, THE
ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968).
36. Roderick Macdonald uses each of these. See RODERICK MACDONALD,
LESSONS OF EVERYDAY LAW/LE DROIT DU QUOTIDIEN (2002). See Edward J.
Eberle’s use of “internal law” in, Comparative law, 13 ANN. SURV. INT’L &
COMP. L. 93, 97-99 (2007). Other writers have even suggested that legal study,
including comparative analysis, should focus on “the mundane and the very
small within its gaze. There is often enough kinship between normative orders at
various level of social life to make them comparable.” Daniel Jutras, The Legal
Dimensions of Everyday Life, 16 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 45, 64 (2001). See also W.
MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999).
37. Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 878 (1988);
see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of
Legal Pluralism, 20 J.L. & SOC’Y 192 (1993). His response has been to suggest
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participants want to emphasize the real continuum between laws
and other norms, it was suggested they might, with other writers,
refer to both as ‘legalities.’ As Christopher Tomlins has recently
defined them, “legalities are not produced in formal legal settings
alone. They are social products, generated in the course of virtually
any repetitive practice of wide acceptance within a specific locale,
call the result rule, custom, tradition, folkway or pastime, popular
belief or protest.” 38 This is admittedly something of a fudge. But
‘legalities’ underlines the similarities between laws and other
norms without ignoring the genuine differences already noted. 39 It
might also be useful, for the purposes of the project, to make finer
distinctions between different types of norms. 40 In addition, as
both comparatists and legal philosophers have noted, there is far
more to the interpretation of the law of the state than a
straightforward reading of its texts; context is critical. 41
Discussions at the Catania Roundtable largely focused on
the questionnaire to be used in the project. For practical purposes,

that “[l]egal norms are whatever people in the social group conventionally
recognize as legal norms through their social practices.” Brian Z. Tamanaha, A
Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 296, 316 (2000);
see also The Internal/External Distinction and the Notion of a Practice in Legal
Theory and Sociolegal Studies, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 163 (1996).
38. Christopher L. Tomlins, The Many Legalities of Colonialization: A
Manifesto of Destiny for Early American Legal History, in THE MANY
LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 2-3 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann
eds., 2001); see also THE LAW AND OTHER LEGALITIES OF IRELAND, 1689-1850
(Michael Brown & Seán Patrick Donlan eds., 2010).
39. Cf. PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF
LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998), especially chapters two and three.
40. Tamanaha has, for example, recently listed “forms of normative
ordering commonly discussed in studies of legal pluralism.” Brian Z. Tamanaha,
Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY
L. REV. 375, 397 (2008). These included both “official or positive legal
systems” as well as “customary,” “religious/cultural,” “economic/capitalist,”
“functional,” and “community/cultural” normative systems. See generally id. at
397-400.
41. See, e.g., Sacco, supra note 23. See also P.G. Monateri & Rodolfo
Sacco, Legal Formants, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998).

368

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

it was agreed that the questionnaire should be completed in 2011. 42
It should be designed in a simple manner, complete with a basic
lexicon of terms as used in project correspondence. The reports
will focus on the contemporary situation in the jurisdictions
covered. 43 It is important, however, that sufficient attention be
given to the historical development of the laws and norms
discussed. Like much of the project, the appropriate amount of text
dedicated to history can be determined together by the Committee
and the Chief Reporters. More critically, the category of normative
hybridity is potentially very wide, extending to ordinary etiquette
and table manners. To narrow our focus, it was agreed that nonstate norms should be limited to either “non-state justice systems”
or to norms or normative orders that significantly influence legal or
normative practices. 44 There is no simple metric for the application
of this standard. The Committee will be responsible for
determining whether reporters have established that norms have
met this requirement. Insofar as is possible, both ‘internal’
perceptions of the actors engaged in the legalities involved and
‘external’ perceptions from actors beyond those legalities should
be considered. The emergence of new legal or normative creations
should also be considered.
Several approaches to the structure of the questionnaire
were considered. It was agreed that the final version should lay out
general headings that must be followed by reporters. These
headings apply to both laws and norms (as defined here). Beneath
the headings, however, will be more specific, optional questions
that might be relevant. These questions might not apply to all
jurisdictions and might not apply to both legal and normative

42. As a working rule, the reports should not exceed 25,000 words.
43. Cf. the “country surveys” in the YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE
EASTERN LAW.
44. MIRANDA FORSYTH, A BIRD THAT FLIES WITH TWO WINGS: KASTOM
AND STATE JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN VANUATU 29 (2009). In discussing “normative
orderings existing outside the state,” she includes “customary law, non-state
justice systems, non-state legal fields, dispute-resolution systems, rule systems,
folk law, informal justice, collective justice, popular justice and vigilantism.” Id.
at 81. See also her discussion in chapter seven (‘A typology of relationships
between state and non-state justice systems’).
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hybridity. The basic, preliminary draft questionnaire includes the
following headings and questions:
1. Historical background: what are the origins of
the major legal and normative traditions,
especially through “diffusion?” How does this
relate to the creation of the jurisdiction
spatially?
2. Sources and institutions: what forms of state
laws or non-state norms are applicable and in
what institutions?
3. Bodies of law and norms: what bodies of state
law or non-state norms—substantive and
procedural—are utilized?
4. Actors: what actors are involved in state law
and non-state norms?
5. Methods:
what
methods—“customary,”
“doctrinal,” “legislative,” and “adjudicative” (or
analogous forms)—are used in state law and
non-state norms?
6. Efficacy: how certain is the enforcement of
state law and non-state norms? What role does
the “rule of (state) law” play in the jurisdiction?
How litigious are people in the various fora
available to them?
7. Regionalism and globalization: what is the
impact of regionalism and globalization—
including cultural, economic, and legal—on
laws and other norms? This includes, of course,
the role of human rights.
8. Identity: what is the relevance of state law and
non-state norms to individual and community
identities? Language, ethnicity, religion, and
culture might all be considered.
As noted, this is a first draft. The final questionnaire will be
completed in 2011. The approach is intended to provide a general,
uniform structure with a menu of questions that will be answered,
as appropriate, by the reporters. Throughout the project, the
Committee will adjust the program and the questionnaire as
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necessary. Participant feedback, project meetings, and the review
of draft reports in advance of publication will almost certainly
suggest changes. A bibliography will also be created for each
report. And, insofar as is possible, the reports should combine
existing empirical research with theoretical insight. 45
An important aspect of the project is the creation of legal
and normative hybrids as the product of the ‘diffusion’ of law and
norms. The mixtures and movements of both are two sides of the
same coin. 46 This is true both of time and space with the result that
“comparative law merges the approach of the legal historian with
that of the legal geographer.” 47 Here comparative lawyers have
generated an impressive, if bewildering, scholarship on the
movements of law and legal thinking. Alan Watson’s ‘transplant’
thesis is especially influential. 48 He has suggested that the
transplantation of legal ideas and institutions is extremely
common. While the difference between a ‘transplant’ and a
‘reception’ is probably best seen as one of degree, the latter is
generally used for more wide-scale borrowing, especially the
historical incorporation of the Romano-canonical ius commune by

45. Given the current size of the project, it is not expected that new studies
can be undertaken. It is hoped, however, that the project might encourage such
research, especially where gaps exist.
46. Cf. Esin Örücü, Mixed and Mixing Systems: A Conceptual Search, in
STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING (Esin Örücü, Elspeth Attwooll
& Sean Coyle eds., 1996).
47. SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES - TEXTS - MATERIALS 178
(7th ed. Ugo A. Mattei, Teemu Ruskola & Antonio Gidi eds., 2009). The editors
define ‘diffusion’ as “the spreading of legal ideas, concepts and rules across
jurisdictions.” Id.
48. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW, (2d ed. 1993); see also ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, IUS COMMUNE LECTURES ON
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 1 (2000). For additional discussions, see Jonathan M.
Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and
Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839
(2003) and Margit Cohn, Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of
Unreasonableness and Proportionality Review of the Administration in the
United Kingdom, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 583 (2010).
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the German states. 49 It can also be used in other contexts, including
the reception of Anglo-American law across the globe. These
concepts are so important to modern comparative analysis that
Michele Graziadei has even suggested that comparative law can be
characterized as the “study of legal transplants and receptions.” 50
In fact, considerable ink has been spent on the metaphors of legal
movement. In contrast to Watson’s organic ‘transplants,’ Nelken
has suggested the more neutral ‘transfers.’ 51 Others speak of
‘contaminations,’ 52 ‘irritants,’ 53 or the ‘migration of law.’54
William Twining’s choice of ‘diffusion’ is preferred here for (i)
reasons of simplicity and (ii) in parallel to discussions of similar
processes within the social sciences. 55 In addition, Twining’s use
of the concept is particularly sophisticated, untangling the deep

49. Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 345
(1996); see also Albert Kocourek, Factors in the Reception of Law, 10 TUL. L.
REV. 209 (1936).
50. Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and
Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2008). Indeed, “[u]nified visions of
legal cultures and legal orders should thus be replaced by a more analytic,
dynamic, and realistic picture of the local law, which also comprises that law’s
interaction with other legal orders.” Id. at 471-472.
51. “The terms we use will make a difference.” David Nelken, Legal
Transplants and Beyond: Of Disciplines and Metaphors, in COMPARATIVE LAW
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 31 (Andrew Harding & Esin Örücü eds., 2000).
52. P.G. Monateri, The Weak Law: Contaminations and Legal Cultures, in
ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE XVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, BRISTOL 1998 (1998). See Olivier Moréteau, An
Introduction to Contamination, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 9 (2010); see also Olivier
Moréteau, Mare Nostrum as the Cauldron of Western Legal Traditions: Stirring
the Broth, Making Sense of Legal Gumbo whilst Understanding Contamination,
in this same volume of the J. CIV. L. STUD.
53. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
54. Örücü has also spoken of “law as transposition,” the “tree model,” and
the “wave theory,” the last two borrowed from linguistics. See Esin Örücü, A
Theoretical Framework for Transfrontier Mobility of Law, in TRANSFRONTIER
MOBILITY OF LAW (Robert Jagtenberg, Esin Örücü, & Annie J. De Roo eds.,
1995) and Esin Örücü, Law as Transposition, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 205
(2002).
55. The term was also used a century ago in Robert W. Lee, The Civil Law
and the Common Law: A World Survey, 14 MICH. L. REV. 89, 90 (1915).
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complexity of the process of diffusion. 56 These are important
considerations in our work. Normative diffusion is, of course, still
more complex. 57
At the time of the Roundtable, potential reporters were
available for Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy,
Libya, Malta, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia, and Turkey. 58 It
was agreed that reporters for additional jurisdictions would also be
sought, especially for those jurisdictions falling outside of Western
Europe. 59 Particularly important was the inclusion of additional
social scientists and, given the levels of relevant research and
scholarship produced in French, that that language should be
included as a working language of the project. The importance of
funding and institutional support was also noted. Subject to
securing such support, the project will progress through meetings,
colloquia, and conferences. These gatherings will foster research
and dialogue and prepare participants for production of the
jurisdictional reports. At all events, the Committee will work to
ensure dissemination of the information generated by participants,
including, most importantly, publication of the final reports. The
process towards publication will include pre-circulation of draft
reports by participants before discussion in a colloquium.
56. See William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 34-35 (2004); see also William Twining, Diffusion and
Globalization Discourse, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 507, 512 (2006). Note that
Twining’s use of the term effectively envelopes the study of both (i) hybridity
and (ii) legal culture. See William Twining, Globalisation and Comparative
Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds.,
2007); see also William Twining, Social Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 J.L.
& SOC’Y 203 (2005).
57. See e.g. the discussion of “ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes,
mediascapes, and ideoscapes” in Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Distance in
the Global Cultural Economy, in MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL
DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
58. Additional reporters are now available.
59. E.g. Albania, Croatia, Lebanon, Montenegro, the Palestinian
Authority, Syria, and additional microstates (Andorra, Gibraltar, Monaco, San
Marino, Vatican City, etc). Additional countries not currently touching the
Mediterranean Sea may also be included—e.g. Jordan and Portugal—depending
on their historical and contemporary connection to the region. Rather than
creating simplistic rules to determine difficult cases, the Committee will decide
on the inclusion of additional countries on a case-by-case basis.
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Participants will then be expected to edit their reports on the basis
of those discussions. As the reports are completed, the project
leaders will prepare a draft general overview to be discussed with
participants. The leaders will complete an introduction and
conclusion for the published collection. Finally, an international
conference will be organized to publicize the project, the network,
the resulting reports, and the database.
Participants also agreed to try to meet at various other
related conferences and events (e.g. the World Society of Mixed
Jurisdiction Jurists’ Third ‘International Congress’ held in
Jerusalem, Israel in June 2011). The extended process of preparing
reports will better enable participants to transcend jurisdictional
and disciplinary boundaries. In addition to the published collection,
we will work to disseminate, as widely as possible, the information
gathered and generated. This will be accomplished in numerous
ways, i.e. through
•
•
•

various public events made possible by the
project;
teaching, blogging, and presentations by
participants;
additional research projects and publications—
both academic and mainstream—generated.

In addition, a website hosting an online database of laws and
norms in the region may be created and updated over the course of
the project. This will provide for the collection of existing primary
and secondary materials, links to information currently dispersed,
and an extensive bibliography. Access to both existing official
legislation and jurisprudence and more complex redactions of
unofficial norms could be included. Each of these will assist
knowledge transfer to jurists and scholars, to practitioners and
policy-makers, and to civil society organizations and the wider
community.
By combining the study of laws and norms and the methods
of the legal and social sciences, the project will produce numerous
conceptual and practical benefits. It will create more accurate,
useful, and accessible accounts of Mediterranean hybridity. It
might spur development of a new framework for scholarly
collaboration. Indeed, it may produce an analytical model more
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useful than existing taxonomies and methods for new research in
the region, in Europe, and around the world. Most importantly, the
project will permit a more empirically-grounded approach to issues
of law and policy. The collective activities of the network and the
research it generates may make important contributions to current
Euro-Mediterranean debates on, for example, commerce, the
environment, and human rights, and security. Another benefit will
be to facilitate discussion of future alignments between
Mediterranean and wider European cultures and their laws, i.e. the
Union for the Mediterranean. Given continuing debates in research
on the Mediterranean, it is important to note that the region will
serve as a geographical and jurisdictional focus for our study. We
do not seek evidence of a reified and perennial Mediterranean
experience. As Peregrine Horden expressed in a different context,
‘[w]e put “the Mediterranean” within our frame rather than assume
it as the frame itself.’ 60 Instead, the region is a laboratory. 61
III. LEGAL HYBRIDITY
The recognition of historical and comparative hybridity,
both legal and normative, allows us to better contextualize modern
traditions identified as ‘mixed legal systems.’ 62 These are
designated as such largely through the failure of comparatists to
assign them elsewhere. 63 The crude classifications of much past
and present comparative study—positivist, centralist, monist—
have often resulted in pushing these jurisdictions “into a marginal

60. Peregrine Horden, Mediterranean Excuses: Historical Writing on the
Mediterranean Since Braudel, 16 HIST. & ANTHROPOLOGY 25, 26 (2005). On
these contemporary debates, see HORDEN & PURCELL, supra note 10.
61. See Dionigi Albera, The Mediterranean as an Anthropological
Laboratory, 16 ANALES DE LA FUNDACIÓN JOAQUÍN COSTA 215 (1999).
62. Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal
Knowledge, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 723, 727 (2009). Cf. the use of
‘hybrid’ in Dorcas White, Some Problems of a Hybrid Legal System: A Case
Study of St Lucia, 30 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 862 (1981) and ‘hybridity’ in Dargo,
supra note 19.
63. Jacques du Plessis, Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal
Systems, in REIMANN & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 50, at 478.
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and uncertain position.” 64 That peripheral status has begun to
change. In the last decade, scholars have increasingly focused on
mixed systems, or at least the European hybrids among them. The
jurisdictions are, or so it has been argued, models for a more mixed
century to come. 65 More specifically, it has been argued that mixed
systems suggest what a future European common law, a novum ius
commune Europaneum, might look like. 66 The implications of
scholarship on mixed jurisdictions is, however, still more
significant. Indeed, as Palmer argues,
[r]ecognizing that hybridity is a universal fact will
no doubt require us to revise some of the received
attitudes and prejudices about mixed systems . . .
[M]ixed systems have been too much at the center
of legal evolution to be regarded as something
unusual or strange. They cannot be both paradigms
and pariahs at the same time. A useful classification
scheme ought to begin with their centrality as a
point of departure. 67
Mixity is thus not the exception, but “the rule.” 68 Mixed traditions
are simply the most explicit and obvious legal hybrids. 69 But

64. See Luigi Moccia, Historical Overview on the Origins and Attitudes of
Comparative Law, in THE COMMON LAW OF EUROPE AND THE FUTURE OF
LEGAL EDUCATION 619 (Bruno De Witte & Caroline Forde eds., 1992). See also
Ake Malmström, The System of Legal Systems: Notes on a Problem of
Classification in Comparative Law, 13 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 129,
148 (1969).
65. See Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism:
Comparative Law Sets Boundaries, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 737, 748-749 (1999).
66. See JAN SMITS, THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: TOWARDS A
IUS COMMUNE EUROPAEUM AS A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM (2002); see also Jan
Smits, Introduction: Mixed Legal Systems and European Private Law, in THE
CONTRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS TO EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Jan
Smits ed., 2001); see also Hein Kötz, The Value of Mixed Legal Systems, 78
TUL. L. REV. 435 (2003).
67. See Vernon Palmer, Mixed Legal Systems . . . and the Myth of Pure
Laws, 67 LA. L. REV. 1205, 1211 (2007).
68. Du Plessis, in REIMANN & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 63, at 481.
69. ‘Mixed jurists,’ those working within or on mixed systems, may be, as
a result, especially sensitive to the hybridity of all traditions. See Esin Örücü, A
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difficulties remain in determining “how mixed a mixed system
must be.” 70 Inevitably, classification of a tradition as mixed—or
indeed ‘pure’—is subjective. It is also fundamentally historical.
The transition from considerable legal hybridity to greater legal
unity, largely occurring in the nineteenth century, also effectively
created the modern distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’ legal
traditions. 71 There remains, however, a meaningful division
between the identification of past and present hybrids. Four
decades ago, Joseph McKnight distinguished “between what may
be termed mixed and that which has already been blended to an
extent that origins of rules are lost in ordinary legal practice. The
distinction is therefore at once a practical and a psychological
one. . . .” 72 While the dividing line between these might be better
seen as a fuzzy border between implicit and explicit mixes, it is
nevertheless a significant distinction.
Discussion of mixed systems can be confusing. The topic is
complex and the vocabulary of ‘mixity’ is “basically an accident of
history.” 73 The classification of jurisdictions, explicitly mixed or

General View of “Legal Families” and of “Mixing Systems”, in ÖRÜCÜ &
NELKEN, supra note 56, at 169-187.
70. Ignazio Castellucci, How Mixed Must a Mixed System be?, 12 ELEC. J.
COMP. L. (May 2008), available at http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-4.pdf (Last
visited November 9, 2011). See also Örücü, supra note 46.
71. This is the “hidden temporal dimension” in the categorization of mixed
traditions. Patrick Glenn, Quebec: Mixité and Monism, in ÖRÜCÜ ET AL., supra
note 46, at 1.
72. Joseph McKnight, Some Historical Observations on Mixed Systems of
Law, 22 JURID. REV. 177, 186 (1977).
73. Vernon Palmer, Mixed Jurisdictions, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 467 (Jan Smits ed., 2006) (referring to mixed jurisdictions).
In two articles, Palmer has traced the genealogy of this terminology. See Vernon
Palmer, Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems, in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS
AT NEW FRONTIERS (Esin Örücü ed., 2010). See also Vernon Palmer, Quebec and
Her Sisters in the Third Legal Family, 54 MCGILL L. J. 321 (2009). Note that
the former is also available in (2008) 3 J. COMP. L. 7 and (2008) 12 ELEC. J.
COMP. L., available at http://www.ejcl.org/121/abs121-16.html (Last visited
November 9, 2011). See also Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal
Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 7 (2003).
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otherwise, remains subjective. 74 In current research, ‘mixed legal
systems’ is generally used for those jurisdictions that contain
significant and explicitly segregated elements of different pannational legal traditions. 75 It remains a residual, catch-all category
for those that cannot be assigned elsewhere and can cover any mix,
whether Western or non-Western. ‘Mixed jurisdictions’ may
sometimes be used in this general manner or for any mixture of
Anglo-American and continental laws. 76 It is most often, however,
applied to a narrower subset of Western mixes that dominate
scholarship. 77 Here, ‘mixed jurisdictions’ refers to situations in
which (i) continental laws are “overlaid” or “suffused” with
Anglo-American laws later in time 78 or (ii) continental private law
is joined to Anglo-American public and criminal law. For

74. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 17 and Palmer (2006), supra note 73,
at 468.
75. For example, a list prepared and posted online by the University of
Ottawa, uses ‘mixed legal systems’ to cover various collections of ‘civil law,’
‘common law,’ ‘customary law,’ ‘Muslim law,’ and ‘Jewish law.’ Mixed Legal
Systems, University of Ottawa, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/classpoli/sys-mixtes.php (Last visited November 9, 2011). See generally,
Classification of Legal Systems and Corresponding Political Entities, University
of Ottawa, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/index-syst.php (Last visited
November 9, 2011).
76. See T.B. Smith, Mixed Jurisdictions, in 6 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (F.H. Lawson ed., 1974), 2-230; T.B.
Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in “Mixed Jurisdictions,” in
CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 5 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965);
Robin Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth of
the Genius of Scots Private Law, 114 L. Q. REV. 228 (1998). By this latter
definition, however, seemingly pure Anglo-American jurisdictions might be
classified as mixed given their past borrowing from pan-European legal
traditions. See Seán Patrick Donlan, All this Together Make Up Our Common
Law: Legal Hybridity in England and Ireland, 1704-1804, in ÖRÜCÜ (2010),
supra note 73.
77. “Facetiously, one might therefore define a mixed jurisdiction as a place
where debate over the subject takes place.” William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions:
Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 680
n.3 (2000).
78. See Smith (1965), supra note 76, at 5; Walton, supra note 4, at 1. In
Israel, Anglo-American law was overlaid with continental law rather than the
other way around. See Stephen Goldstein, Israel, in PALMER (2001), supra note
6, at 448-468.
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historical reasons, the first has usually resulted in the second. The
so-called ‘classical mixed jurisdictions’ are roughly the same,
referring to specific jurisdictions—Louisiana, Puerto Rico,
Quebec, Scotland, and South Africa—on which a scholarly critical
mass has long existed. This terminological plasticity arguably
impedes
more
accurate
classification
and
effective
79
communication. For example, in an important essay on “The idea
of mixed legal systems,” the Channel Islands, Cyprus, and Malta
are each described as ‘mixed jurisdictions.’ 80 In fact, each is quite
distinct, both from one another and the ‘classical mixed
jurisdictions.’ 81 Non-Western mixed systems—Cameroon,
Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, etc—are still more diverse.
A decade ago, Vernon Palmer added another term with the
publication of Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal
Family (2001). A native Louisianan, he emphasized the degree to
which the systems discussed in his work shared “profound
generalizable resemblances.” 82 The work included reports on
Israel, Louisiana, Quebec, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Scotland,

79. See Donlan (2010), supra note 1.
80. Reid, supra note 73, at 7 n.1 (2003). See also George L. Gretton &
Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Civil Law Tradition: Some Thoughts from North of the
Tweed, 11 JERSEY & GUERNSEY L. REV. (2007), available at
www.jerseylaw.je/Publications/jerseylawreview/Oct07/JLR0710_Gretton.aspx
(Last visited November 9, 2011).
81. The legal tradition of the Channel Islands combines Norman
‘Germanic’ folklaw with the pan-European ius commune. This is, in fact, true
for all of Western Europe. But its legal ideas and institutions also reflect both
significant English influence and post-Code civil borrowings. In contrast to the
classical mixed jurisdictions, Maltese criminal law combines both AngloAmerican and continental law at both the substantive and procedural levels. Its
civil procedures also reflect the investigative traditions of the continent. Cyprus,
for example, mixes Anglo-American private law with continental public and
criminal law. Symeon C. Symeonides, The Mixed Legal System of the Republic
of Cyprus, 78 TUL. L. REV. 441 (2003).
82. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 4. See also Seán Patrick Donlan, A
Thing Without Cohesion of Parts: The Professional and Pedagogical
Contribution of Mixed Jurisdictions, 38 IRISH JURIST 383 (2003) (reviewing
VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD
LEGAL FAMILY (2001) and JAN SMITS, THE CONTRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL
SYSTEMS TO EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (2002)).
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and South Africa. 83 Palmer suggests that the jurisdictions can be
treated collectively as a distinctive ‘third legal family’ between the
well-known Anglo-American and continental legal ‘families.’ 84 In
addition to combining continental private law with AngloAmerican public and criminal law, he notes that in each of these
jurisdictions Anglo-American law penetrates, to varying degrees,
both (i) judicial institutions and procedures and (ii) substantive
(private and commercial) law. 85 The former is significant; the latter
varies in a reasonably common “pattern of penetration and
resistance.” 86 Precedent in these jurisdictions falls somewhere
between the parent traditions, “rais[ing] a defining issue in the
quest for the ‘soul’ of the system.” 87 While Palmer, like other
mixed jurists, uses different terms at different times to label these
different jurisdictions, he sees the classical mixed jurisdictions and
the third legal family as synonymous. 88 His classification can
sometimes, however, marginalize elements, especially nonWestern laws and customs, unique to a tradition that might
otherwise exclude it from ‘third family’ gatherings: e.g., the
customary laws of South Africa, the Islamic law of the Philippines,
and the religious laws of Israel. 89
83. A footnote notes that “other of this type” include Botswana, Lesotho,
Mauritius, Saint Lucia, the Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.
PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 4.
84. See PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 7-10 and Palmer (2006), supra
note 73, at 467-468.
85. Indeed, his inclusion of public law was an important shift from the
traditional narrow focus of comparative law on private law. PALMER (2001),
supra note 6, at 6 n.8.
86. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 57. While property law is largely
unaffected, Anglo-American influence on obligations, especially tort, is more
significant. Succession law is somewhat resistant, though pressure for freedom
of testation has altered the laws of some jurisdictions. For practical reasons,
Anglo-American commercial laws were also adopted with little resistance. Id.,
53-59, 66-76 and Palmer (2006), supra note 73, at 471-472, 474. See Palmer’s
detailed synopsis in Palmer (2009), supra note 73, at 343-344.
87. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 45. See id., 44-46. See also Palmer
(2006), supra note 73, at 471.
88. It might be better to see the latter as a subset of the former with
specific traits.
89. But note “The Stellenbosch Papers” generated in a colloquium on
“Mixed Jurisdictions as Models? Perspectives from Southern Africa and
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But Palmer is central to the study of mixed systems. This
is, in part, due to his role as the driving force in the establishment
of the World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists in 2002. But
great strength of his work has been to promote communication
among, and considerable scholarship on, mixed traditions. And
Palmer’s Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide is an especially important
resource for the Mediterranean Project. The work is, as a result of
his method, both far more general and richer in detail than that of
other mixed jurists. His approach was broadly familiar to
comparatists. He collected jurisdictional reports based on a
questionnaire he produced. The study was collaborative, involving
specialists in the respective jurisdictions supplemented by his own
cross-cultural comparison. 90 Palmer’s report categories included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the founding of the system
the magistrates and the courts
judicial methodology
statutory interpretation
mercantile law
procedure and evidence
the judicial reception of common law
the emergence of new legal creations
purists, pollutionists, and pragmatists
the linguistic factor 91

Using these categories, he was able to go into considerably more
detail than earlier discussions of mixed system. It is an obvious
model for our work. And even within the intentionally juridical
limits of his questionnaire, his analysis revealed the importance not
only of history, but of culture, to the development and unique
character of the mixed traditions studied. 92

Beyond”, collected in 25 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1-209 (2010) and introduced by
Palmer.
90. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at 15-16.
91. The expanded questionnaire is included as ‘Appendix A’ in PALMER
(2001), supra note 6, at 471-478. A report bibliography was also included.
92. This is especially true with respect to differences in the source and
living languages of the law in the jurisdictions. PALMER (2001), supra note 6, at
41-44 and Palmer (2006), supra note 73, at 470. See also Roger K. Ward, The
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Equally important to the scholarship on mixed systems and
our project is the work of Esin Örücü. 93 Her writings, perhaps
especially her “Mixed and Mixing Systems: A Conceptual
Search,” may be the most sophisticated general analyses of legal
hybridity. 94 A native of Turkey, she has consistently argued for an
‘expansion’ of research beyond the classical mixed jurisdictions to
more exotic hybrids. 95 She has been especially critical of the
traditional legal families of comparative law. 96 Instead, Örücü has
proposed a “family trees” model that “regards all legal systems as
mixed and overlapping, overtly or covertly, and groups them
according to the proportionate mixture of the ingredients.” 97 She
has also employed an especially colorful vocabulary and useful
models. She has used, for example, culinary terms to describe the
ways in which laws might mix:

French Language in Louisiana Law and Legal Education: A Requiem, 57 LA. L.
REV. 1283 (1997). On culture, see Daniel Visser, Cultural Forces in the Making
of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 41 (2003) and Nir Kedar, Law, Culture
and Civil Codification in a Mixed Legal System, 22 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 177
(2007).
93. Her scholarship on Turkey is especially important to our work. See
especially Esin Örücü, Turkey: Change under Pressure, in ÖRÜCÜ ET AL., supra
note 46 at 89; see also Esin Örücü, Turkey’s Synthetic Legal System and Her
Indigenous Socio-Culture(s) in a “Covert” Mix, in ÖRÜCÜ (2010), supra note
73, at 150.
94. Örücü, supra note 46, at 335. The title—Mixed and Mixing Systems—
underscores the dynamic, on-going nature of hybridity.
95. Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?,
in ÖRÜCÜ (2010), supra note 73. Earlier versions of this article can be found in
3 J. COMP. L. (2008) and in 12:1 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (2008) available at
www.ejcl.org/121/abs121-15.html (Last visited November 9, 2011).
96. Örücü, supra note 69 at 177. See also Sue Farran, Scots Law: A System
in Search of a Family, 61 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 311 (2010). On the rise of
modern comparative taxonomy, see Mariana Pargendler, The Rise and Decline
of Legal Families, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. (2012).
97. See Esin Örücü, Family Trees for Legal Systems: Towards a
Contemporary Approach, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 363, 375 (Mark van Hoecke ed., 2004); see also H. Patrick
Glenn, Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions, in
REIMANN & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 50, at 425.
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At times, elements from socio-culturally similar and
legal-culturally different legal systems come
together forming ‘mixed jurisdictions’ of the
already mentioned “simple” kind, [i.e.] ‘mixing
bowls,’ the ingredients being still in the process of
blending but in need of further processing if a
“puree” is to be produced . . . Next come the
“complex” mixed systems, where the elements
are both socio-culturally and legal-culturally
different . . . [i.e., t]he “Italian salad bowl,” where,
although the salad dressing covers the salad, it is
easy to detect the individual ingredients clearly
through the sides of the glass bowl . . . Then, there
is . . . the “English salad plate,” the ingredients
sitting separately, far apart on a flat plate with a
blob of mayonnaise to the side into which the
different ingredients can be dipped before
consumption. 98
Indeed, Örücü has repeatedly argued that “[i]nstances of mixing
are complicated. They may be overt or covert, structured or
unstructured, complex or simple, blended or unblended.” 99 In her
most recent edited collection, Mixed Legal Systems at New
Frontiers, she has written that “it is invaluable to consider legal
systems, designated as legal pluralisms, in order to appreciate the
relationship between official state law and religious and customary
laws, not only as anthropologists but as comparative lawyers.”100
While this might seem to suggest a focus limited to legal hybridity
or state legal pluralism, she has also argued that “comparative law
studies should extend to norms of non-state law, folk law and
customary law, remembering that the law is global, national and
local.” 101 Combining these ideas of expanding research on legal
98. See Örücü, supra note 69, at 180; see also Orücü, supra note 54, at 1012.
99. Örücü, supra note 95, at 67. As noted, Örücü has also written about the
diffusion of law.
100. See Esin Örücü, General Introduction, in ÖRÜCÜ (2010), supra note
73, at 7; see also Örücü, supra note 46, at 342, 350-351.
101. See Esin Örücü, Developing Comparative Law, in ÖRÜCÜ & NELKEN,
supra note 56, at 60-61. “In the context of ‘legal pluralism,’ law goes far beyond
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hybrids with extending comparative study into other norms is a
challenging, but promising, approach for future study. It is at the
center of our project.
Even limiting ourselves to legal rather than normative
hybridity, there remain still deeper complexities. First, all legal
traditions are hybrids. There are also, however, a number of other
approaches to law that underline the complexity of the most
ordinary law and legal systems. One commonly-acknowledged
type of complexity can be discovered in the distance between
formal law and its actual application. Roscoe Pound famously
formulated this as the gap between the ‘law in books’ and the ‘law
in action.’ 102 If this is now a standard bromide in legal scholarship,
Rodolfo Sacco’s theory of ‘legal formants’ arguably goes still
further, underscoring the considerable diversity in the
interpretation of state laws, a diversity that was frequently rooted
in practical, professional differences among those interpreting the
law. 103 Similarly, the study of ‘legal polycentricity’ stresses legal
diversity within or internal to state law, especially with regard to
sources. 104 Other varieties of post-modern and critical thinking
provide many of the same conclusions. In each of these instances,
the insistence on context significantly problematizes neat divisions
between legal families, portrayed as closed and discrete ‘systems.’
IV. NORMATIVE HYBRIDITY
Örücü’s interest in non-state law reflects a wider “ethos of
pluralism” in legal and social science scholarship. 105 This ethos
reflects the increasingly explicit complexity of contemporary law
and legal systems at the global, national, and sub-national levels.
Both within states and without, it is difficult to ignore the

the so-called ‘official law, and extends to multi-layers o systems. Thus, today,
‘law’ spans the range of positive law and then moves to non-state law, rules,
custom and tradition.” Id., at 60. See also Twining, supra note 56, at 69-89.
102. Pound, supra note 23.
103. Sacco, supra note 23.
104. PETERSEN & ZAHLE, supra note 23 and HIROVONEN, supra note 23.
105. Margaret Davies, The Ethos of Pluralism, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 87, 112
(2005).
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proliferation of laws and the recognition of norms over the course
of the last half-century. Social scientists, in particular
anthropologists and sociologists, have long noted the frequently
fuzzy divisions between state and non-state legalities. 106 The
coexistence of both is, John Griffiths argued, “the omnipresent,
normal situation in human society.” 107 Social scientists and their
allies in the legal academy have provided very sophisticated
analyses, often rooted in empirical study, of these relationships. In
a classic of the genre, Sally Faulk Moore has described these plural
“legal” orders as “semi-autonomous social field[s]” that have
“rule-making capacities, and the means to induce or coerce
compliance; but [are] simultaneously set in a larger social matrix
which can, and does, affect and invade it.” 108 A few comparatists
have also embraced (what I’ve called) hybridity, most notably
Patrick Glenn and Werner Menski. 109 Complementing in many
respects the former’s analysis, Menski, a comparatist and social
geographer, has “place[d] legal pluralism . . . confidently into the
mainstream study of comparative law” and “emphasize[d] the need
for strengthening socio-legal approaches.” 110
In fact, the growth of scholarship on hybridity has brought
an ever-expanding catalogue of ‘pluralist’ approaches. The first
wave of social science research, the so-called ‘classical legal

106. Masaji Chiba, Other Phases of Legal Pluralism in the Contemporary
JURIS
228
(1998),
available
at
World,
11
RATIO
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9337.00088/pdf (Last visited
November 9, 2011).
107. John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism, in 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM
39 (1986). Note his shift to the language of ‘normative pluralism’ in The Idea of
Sociology of Law and its Relation to Law and Society, in 8 LAW AND
SOCIOLOGY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 49, 63-64 (Michael Freeman ed., 2005).
108. Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous
Social Field as an Appropriate Field of Study, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 719, 720
(1973).
109. See also MATTEI ET AL., supra note 47 and Graziadei, supra note 50.
110. WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF AFRICA AND ASIA 16 (2d ed. 2006). “Within a global
framework for the comparative study of law and legal systems, it is evident that
a narrow approach to law as state law leads neither to appropriate understanding
of non-European societies and cultures nor to satisfactory analysis of the
phenomenon of law even in its European manifestations.” Id. at 185-186.
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pluralism,’ focused on non-Western, post-colonial communities.111
It often served as a critique of Western colonialism and hegemony.
An important distinction is also made between (i) ‘weak’ or ‘state
legal pluralism’ in which plural legal orders are effectively part of
the wider state systems and (ii) ‘strong’ or ‘deep legal pluralism’
in which the focus includes both state laws and significant nonstate norms. 112 Understandably, lawyers, including comparatists,
are often more interested in the former than the latter. 113 More
recently, research in so-called ‘new legal pluralism’ has included
case studies of hybridity within the West, suggesting the
continuing importance of non-state norms here. 114 These works
have suggested, that “[i]n most contexts, law is not central to the
maintenance of social order.” 115 And, if the “specifics are not yet
clear,” one element of a third pluralist paradigm—after ‘classical’
and ‘new’ legal pluralism—is “global legal pluralism.” 116 This
encompasses international law, human rights, and, more
problematically, involves the assertion of an increasingly important
111. There were exceptions. In addition to Ehrlich’s work, some early
classics of “legal pluralism” were not limited to colonial societies. See e.g.
GEORGES GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1947) and LEOPOLD POSPISIL,
ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY (1971).
112. See e.g. Gordon Woodman, The Idea of Legal Pluralism, in DUPRET,
supra note 24, at 5.
113. In the former, non-state normative orders exist with the approval of,
or at the sufferance of, the state; the latter refers to non-state normative orders
that exist despite the state. The lawyer’s distinction might be that between intra
or praeter legem on the one hand and contra legem on the other. “‘[W]eak’
pluralism is no more than a plural arrangement in a diversified legal system
whose basic ideology remains centralist.” Menski, supra note 110, at 116.
114. Merry, supra note 37, at 872 et seq. (This has sometimes been linked
to research on ‘social norms’ linked both to political science and to the “law and
economics” movement.); see also William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545 (1994) and ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
(2000).
115. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES 280 (1991).
116. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
1155 (2007); Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 243 (2009). See also Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism
in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed.,
1996); Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism,
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1991-1992).

386

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

commercial ‘law’ or lex mercatoria created by non-state actors.
These are often linked to debates on the character of globalization.
Perhaps more useful to our project is ‘critical legal pluralism.’
Here, rather than “reify[ing] ‘norm-generating communities’ as
surrogates for the State,” the focus is on the role of individuals in
“generating normativity.” 117 Rather than being the product of
formal legislation or even informal custom, individuals are
themselves the site of law or norm creation in a complex and fluid
normative web. 118 In a similar manner, the ‘post-modern legal
pluralism’ of Boaventura de Sousa Santos details a “conception of
different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated and mixed in
our minds, as much as in our actions.” 119 He insists that the
modern situation is one of the thick “interlegality” of both laws
and norms. 120
In addition to the numerous internal debates on legal
pluralism in the social sciences, broadening the mission of
comparative law to include the study of both legal and normative
hybridity has also encountered opposition. Among mixed jurists,
Palmer has expressed concerns about the dangers of expanding the
concept of ‘mixity’ to include the complexities of legal
pluralism. 121 While he has recognized the virtues of a functionalist
or “factual approach” to the study of legal and non-state norms,
Palmer has significant anxieties about the implications of the study

117. Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick Macdonald, What is a Critical
Legal Pluralism? 12 CAN. J.L. SOC’Y 25, 35, 38 (1997). See also Jacques
Vanderlinden, Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later, J. LEGAL
PLURALISM 149, 151-152 (1989).
118. Cf. Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11
(1983) (arguing “that the creation of legal meaning—‘jurisgenesis’—takes place
always through an essentially cultural medium”).
119. Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a
Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 279, 297-298 (1987): see also
BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE:
LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION (2nd ed. 2002); Franz von BendaBeckmann & Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, The Dynamics of Change and
Continuity in Plural Legal Orders, 53-54 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 10 (2006).
120. De Sousa Santos (1987), supra note 119, at 298.
121. Note Palmer’s critical comment on the “eclectic list of systems”—
including Australia, Algeria, and the European Union—discussed in Palmer
(2009), supra note 73, at 333 n.43.
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of hybridity on comparative law, especially in the classification of
legal traditions. In discussing mixed systems, he has expressed
concern about the loss of precision in expanding mixed scholarship
to more complex varieties of legal hybridity or state legal
pluralism:
To legal anthropologists and legal pluralists, the
principal criterion of a mixed system is simply the
presence or interaction of two or more kinds of laws
or legal traditions with the same social field. The
mixed nature of a legal order can be discovered and
confirmed in an objective manner by research and
observation. Any interaction between laws of a
different type or source—indigenous with received,
religious with customary, Western with nonWestern—is sufficient to constitute a mixed legal
system . . . 122
Palmer acknowledges the importance of expanding our
understanding of how hybrid traditions are generated, but remains
cautious:
Attempting to reclassify and reorder the mixed legal
systems of the world in accordance with the
information supplied by historical pluralism, ethnic
pluralism, and transnational legal pluralism is the
next daunting task of comparative law. If it can be
accomplished, it would revolutionize the legal
universe in a way comparable to the Copernican

122. Palmer (2009), supra note 73, at 333. “Pluralism,” he writes, “has yet
to present a taxonomy that differentiates and arranges the hybrids into useful
groupings.” Id. at 335. Kenny Anthony has also noted that “in a mixed system,
unlike a plural system, there is just one set of rules for every situation:” The
Identification and Classification of Mixed Systems of Law, in COMMONWEALTH
CARIBBEAN LEGAL STUDIES: A VOLUME OF ESSAYS TO COMMEMORATE THE
21ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE FACULTY OF LAW OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST
INDIES 194 (Gilbert Kodilinye & P.K. Menon eds. 1992); The Viability of the
Civilist Tradition in St Lucia: A Tentative Appraisal, in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL
CODES OF QUÉBEC AND ST. LUCIA (Raymond Landry & Ernest Caparros eds.
1985).
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revolution on the old Ptolemaic system of
astronomy.
He adds, however, that:
We are far from that at the present time. So far
pluralism is an insight suggesting that the playing
cards need to be reshuffled; it has yet to be shown
how the cards can be re-dealt in a rational and
coherent way. 123
Palmer is right, of course, to note these very real difficulties. 124 It
is, after all, his focus on selected mixtures that has proven most
constructive in the study of mixed systems.
But legal pluralists and their allies are not attempting to
create new classifications, but to provide instead a conceptual
lexicon and analytical models that allow for the unique
characteristics of legal-normative orders (or the intersection of
such orders). 125 And Palmer’s ‘pluralist challenge’ may be met by
the methodological pluralism he has suggested in other writings.
He has written “that there is not, and indeed cannot be, a single
exclusive method that comparative law research should follow.”126
Comparative law must, in fact, “be accessible and its methods must
be flexible.” 127 For example, one response to this pluralist
challenge is to look to alternative approaches to taxonomy. Both (i)
123. Palmer (2010), supra note 73, at 48. “But I predict that if this task is
one day accomplished, it will be done by a mixed jurisdiction jurist, for he or
she knows best that there is a need, and knows best the means to achieve the
goal.” Id. Cf. Örücü, supra note 100, at 7 (including Örücü’s desire for a
“workable grid”).
124. Jane Matthews Glenn has expressed a similar concern that including
“[m]ixity between formal and informal law” in discussions of mixed
jurisdictions “runs the risk of extending the notion beyond recognition.” Jane
Matthews Glenn, Mixed Jurisdictions in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Mixing,
Unmixing, Remixing, in ÖRÜCÜ, supra note 45, at 76, 76. The article is also
available in (2008) 3 J. COMP. L. 53 and (2008) 12 ELEC. J. COMP. L., available
at http://www.ejcl.org/121/abs121-10.html (Last visited November 9, 2011).
125. It is also “first and foremost a scheme of comprehension, and not a
moral or political theory.” Croce, supra note 29, at 38.
126. Vernon Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of
Comparative Law Methodology, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 290 (2005).
127. Id.
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Ugo Mattei and (ii) Marc van Hoecke and Marc Warrington have
recently suggested new models of comparative classification and
corresponding paths to research. 128 The legal philosopher Kaarlo
Tuori has suggested classifying law according to its “surface
level,” “legal culture,” or “deep structure.” 129 Interestingly, Tuori
borrows from, among others, Ferdinand Braudel. Reflecting the
varying rates of historical change detailed in Braudel’s magisterial
work, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age
of Philip II (originally published in French in 1949), Tuori
suggests that:
Even within the law, approached in its symbolic
normative aspect, we can distinguish between levels
obeying different historical times. At the surface
level, change is an everyday phenomenon, at the
level of the legal culture the pace of change slows
down, and the most inert level in its variation is the
deep structure, which represents the long durée of
the law. 130
Each of these approaches reflects a move away from the narrow
observation of black-letter law. Other comparatists have begun to
combine these different methods in novel and productive ways. 131
128. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in
the World’s Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5 (1997); Mark van Hoecke &
Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine:
Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 495
(1998). See also James A. Whitman, Consumerism versus Producerism: A Study
in Comparative Law, 117 YALE L. J. 340 (2007).
129. Kaarlo Tuori, Towards a Multi-layered View of Modern Law, in
JUSTICE, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: A TRIBUTE TO ALEKSANDER PECZENIK ON
THE OCCASION OF THIS 60TH BIRTHDAY 433 (Aulis Aarnio, Robert Alexy &
Gunnar Begholz eds., 1997); see also the discussion in chapter 6 of KAARLO
TUORI, CRITICAL LEGAL POSITIVISM (2002).
130. Id. at 150. See also Kjell Å. Modéer, Mixed Legal Systems and
Coloniality: Parts of the Construct of a Global Legal Culture, in ASIA AND
EUROPE IN GLOBALISATION: CONTINENTS, REGIONS AND NATIONS 14 (Göran
Therborn & Habibul Haque Khondker eds. 2006).
131. Lukas Heckendorn-Urscheler, Multidimensional Hybridity: Nepali
Law from a Comparative Perspective, in CASHIN-RITAINE ET AL., supra note 1,
at 55 (combining the traditional ‘legal families’ approach, Glenn’s ‘legal
traditions,’ and Mattei’s ‘three patterns of law’).
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Alternatively, of course, we might resist the taxonomic urge in
favor of generating additional research. Aware that the two cannot
be easily separated, we might instead “research first, categorize
later.” 132
Our project takes up this task of researching both legal and
normative hybridity, i.e. both ‘state’ and ‘deep’ legal pluralism.
We will do so by combining the concentrated research,
comparative method, and specific results of Palmer with the vivid,
creative conceptual vocabulary of Örücü and the rich resources of
the social sciences. Admittedly, a shift to studying both ‘official’
and ‘unofficial’ legalities significantly complicates the work of
comparative law, drawing jurists into debates they typically avoid
and for which they are arguably ill-prepared. Jurists and social
scientists not only define ‘law’ differently, but also often adopt
very difference methods in their research. In a recent discussion of
law and anthropology, for example, Thomas Bennett usefully
outlined “[i]n very general terms, the preferences of each
discipline . . .”
Perspective
Subject matter of
research
Method
Ultimate concern

COMPARATIVE LAW

LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY

◦Macro
◦Lawyer’s
◦Formal laws
◦Rules and concepts
◦Theoretical and
dogmatic
◦System

◦Micro
◦The subject’s
◦All normative orders
◦Social contexts
◦Participant observation
◦Social result

133

There are obviously more complex approaches between these two
ideal types. They remain, however, meaningful disciplinary
distinctions related to the respective goals of legal and social
132. Ignazio Castellucci, in CASHIN-RITAINE ET AL., supra note 1, at 75. In
conversation, Castellucci has also noted that “only two things in life are certain:
death and taxonomy.” We are, it is true, classifying animals. See also Giovanni
Marini, Foreword: Legal Traditions–A Critical Appraisal, 2 COMP. L. REV. 1
(2011),
available
at
www.comparativelawreview.com/ojs/index.php/CoLR/article/view/15/19 (Last
visited November 9, 2011).
133. T.W. Bennett, Legal Anthropology and Comparative Law: A
Disciplinary Compromise, 21 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 1, 16-19 (2010).
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science research and pedagogy. The prescriptive purposes of state
laws, either for social ordering or legal practice, are quite different
from the comparative luxury of the descriptive research of social
scientists. Tamanaha has created a similar table comparing “legal
versus social scientific perspectives:”
Concept of law

FIRST CATEGORY–
LIVED NORMS

SECOND CATEGORY–
ENFORCED NORMS

Phase

◦Patterned or regular
conduct

◦Social reaction to
disruption of regular
conduct

‘Legal’ Mechanism

◦Complex of social
obligations

◦Institutionally imposed
sanction

Sociological Studies

◦Internal control—
conformity

◦External control—
response to deviance

Sociological
Mechanism

◦Socialization

◦Coercive application of
power

Effective Moment

◦Proactive (shaping
conduct)

◦Reactive (following
disruptive conduct) 134

These disciplinary differences reflect not only distinctive training
and research, but mirror the distinction between legal and
normative hybridity, between “(state-)enforced” and “lived”
norms. Combining the study of both will require a rarely exhibited
interdisciplinary spirit. 135 It will demand considerable
collaboration and dialogue as well as translation between legal and
social science vocabularies. 136 We are optimistic about both the
practicalities and the possibilities of our project. As Örücü has
written, “[i]f comparatists and regionalists work more closely in
the future, the outcome will prove to be extremely beneficial to
both and to legal scholarship.” 137
134. Brian Z. Tamanaha, An Analytical Map of Social Scientific
Approaches to the Concept of Law, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 501, 523 (1995).
135. William Twining, Law and Anthropology: A Case Study in InterDisciplinary Collaboration, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 561 (1973).
136. See also David Nelken, Can Law Learn From Social Science?, 35
ISR. L. REV. 205 (2001).
137. Esin Örücü, The Boundaries of Unity: Mixed Systems in Action, J.
COMP. L. 1, 6 (2008).
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While there are real obstacles to such research, several
writers have recommended that the study of pluralism or hybridity
might be the ideal subject on which jurists and social scientists can
collaborate. Annelise Riles has suggested, for example, a “new
rapprochement” was occurring between comparatists and sociolegal jurists, not least because of legal pluralism. 138 Roger
Cotterrell has similarly written that “comparative law and legal
sociology are interdependent and . . . their central, most general
and most ambitious scientific projects—to understand law in its
development and its variety as an aspect of social life—are
identical.” 139 His suggestion that “a genuinely pluralist approach”
to law involves shifting the research focus away from the state to
communities might also be of particular use to our work. 140 With
others, Cotterrell has specifically noted that scholarship on
comparative law and legal culture is also promising. 141 Indeed, it
points away from positivist understandings of law and “towards a
legal pluralist understanding of the scope of law that is close to that
of many legal sociologists and legal anthropologists.” 142 Indeed, as
Nelken notes:
138. Annelise Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies, in
REIMANN & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 50, at 777. See id., at 805-806. See
Bennett, supra note 133, at 25.
139. ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY: LEGAL IDEAS IN
THE MIRROR OF SOCIAL THEORY 129 (2006); see Roger Cotterrell, Comparatists
and Sociology, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND
TRANSITIONS 135 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003); see also
Nelken, supra note 51, at 22. For an earlier attempt, see JEROME HALL,
COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY (1963) and Jerome Hall, Comparative
Law and Jurisprudence, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 61 (1966).
140. Roger Cotterrell, Transnational Communities and the Concept of
Law, 21 RATIO JURIS 1, 10 (2008). See particularly the types of legal pluralism
(monistic, agnostic, statist, and genuinely pluralist) discussed in id., at 8–10. See
also Roger Cotterrell, A Legal Concept of Community, 12 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 75;
see also ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW’S COMMUNITY: LEGAL THEORY IN
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1995).
141. See COTTERRELL, supra note 138, at 81-82 and Roger Cotterrell, The
Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 13 (David Nelken
ed., 1997).
142. Roger Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture, in REIMANN
& ZIMMERMANN, supra note 50, at 729; see also RENDEZVOUS OF EUROPEAN
LEGAL CULTURES (Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde & Knut Einar Skodvin eds., 2010).
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In employing the idea of legal culture in
comparative exercises geared to exploring the
similarities and differences amongst legal practices
and legal worlds the aim is to go beyond the tired
categories so often relied on in comparative law
such as ‘families of law’ and incorporate that
attention to the ‘law in action’ and ‘living law’
which is usually missing from comparative lawyers’
classifications and descriptions. 143
Our project may appropriately be seen as a comparative study of
both the ‘law in action’ and the ‘living law’ (as Ehrlich called it) in
the Mediterranean. 144 This cultural approach to comparative law is
promising. It may even be essential to any genuine understanding
of normative ordering, whether of the state or society, in
context. 145
Acknowledging the ubiquity of hybridity has important
consequences for both comparative law and for legal theory. 146 It
undermines the dissection of plural and dynamic traditions into
discrete, closed legal families or systems. It challenges legal

143. David Nelken, Using the Concept of Legal Culture, AUSTRALIAN J.
LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2004). Note section II, “Legal Delay in Italy: A Case Study.” Id.
at 11-26. See David Nelken, Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture,
in ÖRÜCÜ & NELKEN, supra note 56.
144. In discussing Ehrlich, Nelken writes that “it may be helpful to
distinguish developments in the study of law beyond the law (law other than that
contained in statutes and judgments), law without the state (especially the
coexistence of plural legal regimes), and order without the law (the implicit
norms that make order possible).” David Nelkin, Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law,
and Plural Legalities, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 443, 466 (2008). See
David Nelken, Law in Action or Living Law?: Back to the Beginning in
Sociology of Law, 4 LEGAL STUD. 157, 169 et seq. (1984). See also Mathias
Hertogh, A “European” Conception of a Legal Consciousness: Rediscovering
Eugen Ehrlich, 31 J.L. & SOC’Y 457 (2004).
145. In part, this is the recognition that law is “constituted by culture, and
culture (in no small way) by law.” LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE xii
(2006).
146. Juris Diversitas, with the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, held a
conference (21-22 October 2011) on the theme of “The Concept of ’Law‘ in
Context: Comparative Law, Legal Philosophy, & the Social Sciences.” A
collection of essays from that conference will be published in 2012.
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nationalism, positivism, centralism, and monism. 147 Indeed, much
of the scholarship of legal pluralism was rooted in a critique of
state- and state law-centered analytical models. 148 This parallels
legal theory, informed by legal history, which suggests that much
of the legal and moral thought of the pre-modern era adopted, by
necessity, a more complex view of human ordering. 149 Similarly,
contemporary legal philosophers like Twining and Tamanaha—
each with their own personal experiences with hybridity and links
to the social sciences—have recently recognized the value, or
necessity, of incorporating multiple sources of legal and normative
authority into their analysis. 150 Twining, for example, has stressed
the importance of moving beyond Euro-centric and state-centered
legal theory in an age of globalization. In demanding a less
parochial ‘general jurisprudence,’ he noted that:
A reasonably inclusive cosmopolitan discipline of
law needs to encompass all levels of relations and
of ordering, relations between these levels, and all
important forms of law including supra-state (e.g.
international, regional) and non-state law (e.g.
religious, transnational law, chthonic law, i.e.
tradition/custom) and various forms of ‘soft law’ 151

147. Roderick Macdonald and David Sandomiershi extend this critique to
“prescriptivism,” which is “the belief that law is a social fact existing outside
and apart from those whose conduct it claims to regulate.” Roderick Macdonald
& David Sandomiershi, Against Nomopolies, 57 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 610, 615
(2006).
148. Griffiths, supra note 107, at 39.
149. As Geoffrey Samuel notes, with admittedly different ends, “[t]he task
of historical jurisprudence is not, then, to provide the basis for a philosophy of
law. It is to provide insights into law as an object of knowledge.” Geoffrey
Samuel, Science, Law and History: Historical Jurisprudence and Modern Legal
Theory, 41 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 1, 3 (1990). See also Harold J. Berman, The
Historical Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 13 (2005) and Geoffrey
MacCormack, Historical Jurisprudence, 5 LEGAL STUD. 256 (1985).
150. Twining was born, raised, and taught for some time in Africa;
Tamanaha is a native of Hawaii and practiced law there and in Micronesia.
151. Twining, supra note 56, at 71. This acknowledgement “that
normative and legal orders can co-exist in the same time-space context,” he
notes, “greatly complicates the tasks of comparative law.” Id.
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Although there are important differences between their approaches,
Tamanaha has made similar arguments. 152 For both, state law is
but one manifestation of normative ordering and the study of legal
theory is closely linked to comparative law and socio-legal studies.
And Twining and Tamanaha are not alone. 153 Such theoretical
insights will inform our project. But it is hoped that the data
generated by the project as well as the project’s conclusions may
also contribute to a more grounded philosophy of law and
normative ordering.
V. CONCLUSION
In concluding, it is important to note that the legal
traditions and normative orders that are the focus of the
Mediterranean Hybridity Project are, by their nature, fluid and
slippery, constantly in flux. Even their component parts are
hybrids. As the anthropologist Brian Stross wrote in discussing
‘hybrid’ as a metaphor:
There are after all no ‘pure’ individuals, no ‘pure’
cultures, no ‘pure’ genres. All things are of
necessity ‘hybrid.’ Of course we can construct them
to be relatively ‘pure,’ and in fact we do so, which
is precise how we manage to get (new) hybrids
from purebreds that are (former) hybrids. 154
This article has briefly sketched an outline of our attempt to
capture the legal and normative complexity of the Mediterranean
region. It may be too much, of course, to ask that scholars as
individuals grasp both the theoretical writings and detailed case
studies of both jurists and social scientists. But a collaborative,
interdisciplinary project might successfully combine both theory
152. BRIAN TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND
SOCIETY (2001). On Tamanaha, see William Twining, A Post-Westphalian
Conception of Law, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 199 (2003).
153. See, e.g., EMMANUEL MELISSARIS, UBIQUITOUS LAW: LEGAL THEORY
AND THE SPACE FOR LEGAL PLURALISM (2009) and DETLEF VON DANIELS, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW FROM A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2010). See also
MENSKI, supra note 110, at chapter three.
154. Stross, supra note 16, at 266-267.

396

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

and practice to produce new information and novel insights on
both hybridity and diffusion. In attempting this, our project will
combine three elements. First, the comparative method,
concentrated research, and specific results of Professor Palmer on
the classical mixed jurisdictions and the ‘third legal family.’
Second, the expansive vision and vivid conceptual vocabulary of
Professor Örücü in her research on comparative law and mixed
legal systems. Third, we will add the rich resources of the social
sciences, especially the extensive scholarship on legal or normative
pluralism. Recent political reforms and continuing social crises
across the region suggest how timely and useful the Mediterranean
Hybridity Project might be.

